搜索结果: 1-15 共查到“军事学 BLAKE”相关记录17条 . 查询时间(0.055 秒)
In this paper, we study the security margins of hash functions BLAKE and BLAKE2 against
the boomerang attack. We launch boomerang attacks on all four members of BLAKE and BLAKE2,
and compare their c...
Higher-Order Differential Meet-in-The-Middle Preimage Attacks on SHA-1 and BLAKE
SHA-1 BLAKE BLAKE2
2015/12/30
At CRYPTO 2012, Knellwolf and Khovratovich presented a differential
formulation of advanced meet-in-the-middle techniques for preimage attacks on hash
functions. They demonstrated the usefulness of ...
Improved Boomerang Attacks on Round-Reduced SM3 and BLAKE-256
hash function BLAKE SM3 boomerang attack
2013/12/17
In this paper we study the security of hash functions SM3 and BLAKE-256 against boomerang attack. SM3 is designed by X. Wang et al. and published by Chinese Commercial Cryptography Administration Offi...
Compact Hardware Implementations of ChaCha, BLAKE, Threefish, and Skein on FPGA
BLAKE Threefish Skein on FPGA
2013/3/3
The cryptographic hash functions BLAKE and Skein are built from the ChaCha stream cipher and the tweakable Threefish block cipher, respectively. Interestingly enough, they are based on the same arithm...
The hash algorithm BLAKE, one of the SHA-3 finalists, was designed by Aumasson, Henzen, Meier, and Phan. Unlike other SHA-3 finalists, there is no known indifferentiable security proof on BLAKE. In th...
Provable Security of BLAKE with Non-Ideal Compression Function
secret-key cryptography / SHA-3 BLAKE collision resistance
2011/11/21
We analyze the security of the SHA-3 finalist BLAKE. The BLAKE hash function follows the HAIFA design methodology, and as such it achieves optimal preimage, second preimage and collision resistance, a...
The hash algorithm BLAKE, one of the SHA-3 finalists, was designed by Aumasson, Henzen, Meier, and Phan. Unlike other SHA-3 finalists, there is no known indifferentiable security proof on BLAKE. In th...
The hash algorithm BLAKE, one of the SHA-3 finalists, was designed by Aumasson, Henzen, Meier, and Phan. Unlike other SHA-3 finalists, there is no known indifferentiable security proof on BLAKE. In th...
Provable Security of BLAKE with Non-Ideal Compression Function
secret-key cryptography / SHA-3 BLAKE collision resistance (second) preimage resistance indifferentiability
2011/11/17
We analyze the security of the SHA-3 finalist BLAKE. The BLAKE hash function follows the HAIFA design methodology, and as such it achieves optimal preimage, second preimage and collision resistance, a...
Provable Security of BLAKE with Non-Ideal Compression Function
secret-key cryptography / SHA-3, BLAKE collision resistance (second) preimage resistance indifferentiability
2011/11/17
We analyze the security of the SHA-3 finalist BLAKE. The BLAKE hash function follows the HAIFA design methodology, and as such it achieves optimal preimage, second preimage and collision resistance, a...
Near-Collisions on the Reduced-Round Compression Functions of Skein and BLAKE
Hash function Near-collision SHA-3 candidates Skein BLAKE
2010/6/24
The SHA-3 competition organized by NIST aims to find a new hash standard as a replacement of SHA-2. Till now, 14 submissions have been selected as the second round candidates, including Skein and BLAK...
Compact Implementations of BLAKE-32 and BLAKE-64 on FPGA
SHA-3 BLAKE fully autonomous implementation compact im-plementation FPGA
2010/4/7
We propose compact architectures of the SHA-3 candidates
BLAKE-32 and BLAKE-64 for several FPGA families. We harness the
intrinsic parallelism of the algorithm to interleave the computation of
four...
Differential and invertibility properties of BLAKE（full version）
BLAKE cryptanalysis hash functions
2010/2/1
BLAKE is a hash function selected by NIST as one of the 14 second round candidates for
the SHA-3 Competition. In this paper, we follow a bottom-up approach to exhibit properties of BLAKE and of its b...
Blake-Wilson, Johnson & Menezes Protocol Revisited
Authenticated key exchange Provably secure BJM protocol
2009/11/18
In this paper, we investigate the famous Blake-Wilson, Johnson & Menezes
(BJM) authenticated key exchange protocols. We observe that the Corrupt
query in the BJM model is not very reasonable, i.e. i...
High-Speed Hardware Implementations of BLAKE, Blue Midnight Wish, CubeHash,ECHO, Fugue, Gr stl, Hamsi, JH, Keccak,Lu a, Shabal, SHAvite-3, SIMD, and Skein Version 2.0, November 11, 2009
SHA-3 round 2 hardware
2009/11/18
In this paper we describe our high-speed hardware implementations
of the 14 candidates of the second evaluation round of the
SHA-3 hash function competition. We synthesized all implementations
usin...